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One mOnth intO the 1994 Rwandan genocide, U.S. President Bill Clinton’s National Security Advisors considered options to jam, destroy, or counter Radio 
Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), the radio station 
used by Hutu extremists to incite and direct machete-wielding 
mobs. The administration ultimately decided not to take any 
action against RTLM. The primary reason — doing so would 
violate international communications law.1
Now suppose that where the U.S. government declined 
to act, a wealthy individual hired private contractors to jam 
RTLM’s transmissions, in violation of communications law and 
other laws. Such an action may arguably be legal, perhaps on the 
grounds that the jus cogens norm prohibiting genocide super-
sedes international communications law.2 It is possible that no 
legal action would have been taken against the actor involved.3 
For private donors and contractors, however, taking this action 
in real time would have required a decision to willfully break 
laws and take aggressive, invasive action normally thought to 
be the sole right of states. 
This article explores the conditions under which private 
actors — individuals or organizations acting without govern-
ment authority — are justified in breaking the law to protect 
civilians from mass atrocity. Such actions could range from 
training civilians to evade danger to destroying or disabling 
equipment, to hiring “mercenaries” to use deadly force. The 
article posits that while states should remain the “protectors of 
choice,” there are cases where laws that would prevent private 
actors from protecting civilians are unjust and can be broken 
with caution. The article also proposes a set of “just-case crite-
ria” drawn from civil disobedience theory and the Responsibility 
to Protect, offered as a starting point to determine when such 
actions are justified. 
Civil DisobeDienCe anD a Private role in the 
resPonsibility to ProteCt
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter, and the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention) 
address the need for governments to take otherwise illegal mea-
sures to halt the worst crimes. Private actors, however, have no 
such guidance for acting when governments fail to. According 
to the R2P doctrine, when sovereign governments fail to uphold 
their duty to protect civilians, that responsibility falls to other 
nations, preferably under authority of the United Nations (UN). 
Where the intervention must occur without consent of the host 
government, R2P suggests that states have the right (indeed, 
responsibility) to intervene so long as 1) the situation is dire 
enough; 2) non-military options have been exhausted; and 3) the 
intervener has the proper intent, uses proportional means, and 
has reasonable prospects of success.4
“Now suppose 
that where the U.S. 
government declined to 
act [to end genocidal radio 
broadcasts], a wealthy 
individual hired private 
contractors to jam . . .  
transmissions, in violation 
of communications laws.”
Presumably states have become the subject of international 
norms and laws regarding intervention against mass atrocities 
because they are most capable of marshalling the resources, 
engaging in diplomacy, levying sanctions or offering incen-
tives, coordinating amongst each other, and acting as guarantors 
of settlements. But when the state-based chain of responsibil-
ity proposed by R2P or called for by other instrument fails to 
protect civilians from atrocities, what role should private actors 
have in taking up this responsibility? 
Unfortunately, no parallel to R2P (or the Genocide 
Convention, or Chapter VII of the UN Charter) exists to guide 
the actions of private individuals who endeavor to protect 
civilians when states fail. The absence of regulations for such 
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actions is not a positive indication of international consensus 
that individuals cannot participate in such actions. Indeed, 
private actors have important attributes such as fewer political 
constraints, flexibility and agility in making decisions, and the 
ability to deny having national interests. Moreover, where states 
fail to take sufficient actions — as with the Rwanda RTLM 
case — private actors may be a victim’s only remaining source 
of protection. 
In cases where private actors can help protect civilians 
without violating any laws, there is nothing to prohibit them 
from doing so. The question then is what to do in cases where a 
private actor would have to violate laws to protect civilians. The 
bodies of international law cited above discuss the permissibility 
of or the duty to violate such laws to protect civilians but only 
with respect to state actors; however, the cornerstones of these 
laws — the “right to life” and the prohibition of genocide — 
do not lose their significance when private actors uphold them 
rather than states. 
Beyond international law, another useful framework in 
analyzing this problem is civil disobedience. Henry David 
Thoreau’s essay Civil Disobedience advocates breaking laws 
that are supportive of unjust policies.5 Is it also appropriate 
for private actors to selectively pose “resistance to genocidal 
governments” by taking actions to protect civilian targets, even 
when doing so requires breaking laws? This article does not 
attempt to prove that private citizens not party to a given atrocity 
have a moral duty to take any action, legal or illegal, to protect 
civilians abroad. Instead it attempts to prompt discussion and 
propose conditions under which private citizens who believe 
they do have that duty can justifiably claim the right to violate 
laws, particularly those regarding state sovereignty, to protect 
civilians from atrocities. 
When is it neCessary to violate laWs to  
ProteCt Civilians?
This section addresses a number of past cases where law-
breaking was, or is, thought to be necessary to protect civilians 
from mass killing. Illegal protective actions are generally treated 
as rare exceptions for which there is no legal frame-
work.6 The existence of these precedents is not neces-
sarily sufficient to argue that such actions are justified, 
but is helpful in framing the types of actions that have 
occasionally been employed.
Large-scale covert or non-consensual aid opera-
tions have been conducted in Afghanistan, El Salvador, 
South Africa, Ethiopia (for Tigray and Eritrea), Iraq, 
Kosovo, Burma, North Korea, and Sudan, as well 
as in Guatemala and Cambodia.7  While this is not 
“protection” aimed at halting atrocities, such actions 
do help to keep alive those affected by mass atroci-
ties. For example, in Biafra, the Nigerian government 
used starvation as an indiscriminate weapon against a 
secessionist rebel movement and its civilian base. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
which normally operates only with consent, joined with 
non-governmental organizations and donors to fly 5,314 
(illegal) missions in privately rented planes dropping food into 
the besieged area.8 
Illegal activities have also been used to help people escape 
from imminent harm. Oftentimes, these have been conducted by 
individuals, using guile and trickery, sometimes acting with the 
support of private and government donors. For example, during 
the Holocaust, private actors frequently created false documents 
and bribed Nazi officials to secure the release of their victims.9 
Raoul Wallenberg saved as many as 100,000 Jews from Nazi 
extermination by “deception, bribery, blackmail, bogus docu-
ments, false front safe houses, and more.”10 Chiune Sugihara, a 
Japanese diplomat in Shanghai, issued illegal transit visas that 
saved the lives of some 10,000 Jews.11 Covert aid and protection 
activities continue today, in Burma where medical assistance 
is provided across the Thai border, and in North Korea where 
a large networks of organizations and individuals have helped 
thousands of civilians escape through an underground railroad 
that includes at least nine other countries.12
oPtions for Privately suPPorteD ProteCtion  
anD the laWs they break
Despite precedent, sizable opportunities for private funding 
in support of protection activities have gone untapped. There are 
no examples akin to private citizens jamming radio broadcasts, 
as could have been done to slow the slaughter in Rwanda in 
1994. Little is done to use private resources and organizations 
to prepare vulnerable civilians for atrocities before they occur 
— e.g., through training and early warning networks. These 
activities may be prohibited by many governments, particularly 
when they plan on attacking those civilians. 
Privately hiring unmanned aerial vehicles to “spy” on or 
deter perpetrators, or to warn civilians of incoming danger, 
has been considered quietly but never employed. Privately-
employed intelligence contractors could obtain information on 
perpetrators, their plans, their weaknesses, and opportunities to 
counter them politically or otherwise. These options are moder-
ate compared to the possibility of privately hiring security con-
tractors to utilize electronic countermeasures (e.g., disrupting 
radio communications), or to destroy or disable transportation or 
communications equipment. At the extreme, security contractors 












Children who fled the fighting in Rwanda rest in Ndosha camp in Goma.
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perpetrators from attacking civilians or even to actively pursue, 
kill, or scatter perpetrating forces. Whatever the current legal 
hurdles, might private support for some of these action some-
times be justified when governments fail to protect civilians? 
There are two general modalities by which private actors can 
support protective activities. In the ideal case, state actors are 
already trying to protect civilians through authorized missions 
and activities, for example through UN peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement missions. In this case, missions may need assis-
tance with training and equipment, which private donors could 
help provide if appropriate mechanisms were put in place. This 
could be done legally. Where there is not an authorized mission 
or that mission is severely hampered — e.g., by the requirement 
of acting within the consent of the host government — private 
actors must instead consider the option of supporting these 
activities through non-governmental agencies, private contrac-
tors, and local groups as appropriate. 
The types of laws that these actions would break generally 
fall into four categories that reflect different levels of potential 
harm associated with breaking the law. Thus, they may require 
differing levels of justification. Each of these categories is dis-
cussed below.
 
1. violations of the PerPetrator’s sovereign 
Controls
By far the most common legal violations caused by protection 
activities relate to the sovereignty of the country in question. In 
some cases, laws that would be broken while protecting civilians 
fall under international conventions — for example, regarding 
communications or access to airspace. In the majority of cases, 
the laws in question are domestic, however, and are used by 
governments to prevent entry of people and supplies that would 
provide aid or security to civilians. Domestic measures falling in 
this category include strict regulation of visas and travel permits; 
licenses to operate as a business or non-profit entity; licenses 
to hire workers; licenses to import goods; access to land; and 
licenses to own or operate equipment such as vehicles, radios, 
and generators. Airspace can also be restricted, preventing the 
use of manned or unmanned aircraft for observation, early warn-
ing, and delivery of aid.  Restrictions on freedom of speech also 
apply: training individuals in tactics that will help them survive 
or providing information regarding violent threats to them may 
be viewed by the host government as prohibited discussion of 
security or political issues, or as libel against the government. 
Altogether, laws in this category are the most evidently “unjust” 
when they are clearly used to further a government’s efforts to 
kill large numbers of civilians and prevent outside intervention 
to protect or care for civilians. 
2. violations of sovereign Controls in other 
Countries (non-PerPetrators)
Restrictive laws may also be imposed by countries other than 
the one where violence is occurring. First, neighboring countries 
may prevent access to their borders. For example, technologies 
such as unmanned aerial vehicles may be deployed from or 
radio transmissions may originate in these countries. Equipment 
may also need to be transported through countries, requiring 
permission or licenses. Hence, borders may need to be crossed 
illegally.
Countries where equipment or finance for these projects 
originates may also have applicable laws. Protected technolo-
gies, such as night vision goggles, may require export licenses. 
Financial sanctions preventing operations in a country may be in 
place. Anti-terrorism laws may also apply. In the current form of 
the USA Patriot Act and Real I.D. Act, for example, any group 
in armed opposition to a government may be considered a ter-
rorist organization, and support for those associated with these 
groups — even those who are clearly the victims of terror or 
have fought alongside U.S. forces — can be considered material 
support to a terrorist organization.13 Finally, “underground rail-
roads” that issue false travel documents, bribing border guards, 
or other means of moving people illegally may violate laws of 
several countries. At first glance, these laws may not be deeply 
unjust as those employed directly by governments perpetrating 
atrocities with the intent of harming civilians. They may, how-
ever, be equally unjust in consequence.
Japanese Diplomat 
Sugihara Chiune (left) 
and Swedish Raoul 
Wallenberg (right) saved 
110,000 Jews from 
Nazi extermination by 
creating and issuing false 
documents.
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3. DestruCtion of ProPerty or interferenCe  
in its use
Destroying or disabling the property of perpetrators may 
aim to limit the capability of the perpetrator or impose a cost in 
hopes of altering the perpetrator’s actions. The case of Rwanda’s 
RTLM radio broadcasts falls in this category: the antenna could 
be permanently destroyed, or one could interfere in the equip-
ment’s normal operation by jamming it electronically14 with the 
hope that doing so would hamper the Interahamwe’s ability to 
continue their genocide.
Beyond interfering with civilian radio broadcasts, this 
category involves numerous other possible efforts to protect 
civilians. Military equipment such as weapons, vehicles, or 
communications gear could be destroyed, sabotaged, jammed, 
or even temporarily disabled. Other examples where govern-
ments have used or considered these options include proposals 
to bomb railroad tracks leading to Nazi-run concentration camps 
during World War II, or the use of targeted financial sanctions 
against individuals responsible for planning or executing mass 
violence. 
4. aCtual, threateneD, or riskeD PhysiCal harm  
to inDiviDuals
The most contentious and worrisome, but also perhaps still 
justifiable, ways in which laws might be broken include cases 
where physical force or the threat of force is used to alter the 
capabilities of perpetrators. These may include defensive acts, 
such as providing armed deterrence to protect civilian groups 
and areas, or offensive attacks, such as intentionally destroying 
or scattering the perpetrating force. This category also includes 
any action which might unintentionally result in physical harm 
to individuals. 
When are Private aCtors JustifieD in  
breaking laWs?
Without the law as ultimate guidance, where can private 
actors look for authority and restraint? As a first approximation, 
I propose a set of criteria and conditions for illegal action by 
private citizens, somewhat similar to R2P’s criteria for military 
intervention by states:
1.  Conditions: While there has been much debate over which 
conditions (conflicts) justify military intervention under 
R2P, a nascent consensus may be emerging that R2P applies 
to the “worst” cases, specifically, genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.15 The same conditions could be 
considered requirements for justification of private actors’ 
breaking of laws in order to protect civilians. 
2.  Precautionary principles: R2P lists four precautionary prin-
ciples to limit actions that violate sovereignty — right inten-
tion; last resort (i.e. peaceful methods have been reasonably 
exhausted); proportional means; and reasonable prospects of 
success.16 Similar principles could apply to action by private 
actors when they believe they must violate laws to protect 
civilians. The following may be a useful starting point for 
applying these concepts to private actors :
	 •	  Right intention: As with military intervention by states, 
any illegal protection act undertaken by private citizens 
must be done for the right reasons, i.e. with a moral inter-
est in protecting those civilians being targeted.
	 •	  Last resort (states first, legal options first): Private 
actions violating laws are not yet justifiable when other 
realistic options exist, such as (1) waiting for govern-
ments to protect civilians or advocating for governments 
to do so more effectively; (2) changing the laws that must 
be broken or obtaining a waiver to do so; or (3) protecting 
civilians just as effectively without breaking any laws. If 
reasonable analysis suggests, however, that these options 
are unlikely to provide protection in time, then private 
actions that break laws may be justified. Applying this 
criterion requires considerable judgment, and thus it may 
not be sufficiently operationalized. Nevertheless, in cases 
where mass killing is occurring at a high rate, and states 
are showing reluctance to halt it immediately, there is 
a strong argument that states are failing to fulfill their 
responsibilities in time, and actions akin to the jamming 
of RTLM by private civilians may be justified.
	 •	  Least harmful, most beneficial option: Four categories 
were presented for the types of laws that may need to 
be broken to protect civilians: those involving sovereign 
controls used by the perpetrator to further policies of 
“So long as private citizens have resources to offer for 
protection of civilians when states fail to protect them, 
we should consider how such citizens can act in a manner 
consistent with the supreme importance of the right to 
life and the prohibition of genocide, even when doing so 
requires breaking laws that otherwise ought to be respected.”
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EndnotEs: Resistance to Genocidal Governments
mass killing; those involving sovereign controls of non-
perpetrating states; those that damage or interfere with 
property; and those that harm, threaten to harm, or kill 
individuals. These categories are ordered by increasing 
degree of harm caused or risked by the protective actions. 
Therefore, actions should be taken as near to the first 
category and as far from the last as possible.
   Nevertheless, is not an absolute rule: if actions can be 
taken that are vastly more effective but come with a 
greater actual or potential harm, they may be more justi-
fied than a less harmful action with a lesser benefit in 
terms of civilians protected. This somewhat resembles 
both “proportional means” and “reasonable prospects of 
success” under the R2P model in that it turns on an esti-
mate of the consequences.
   The calculation is also similar to an assessment of 
whether the law being broken is consequentially “unjust.” 
If following a law allows mass killing, whereas violat-
ing that law causes little harm but protects civilians, the 
law is unjust in consequence. The “least harmful, most 
beneficial” criterion further specifies that “more unjust” 
laws — those causing the greatest harm for the least ben-
efit — should be broken rather than “less unjust” ones, 
which cause less harm or have greater benefits if kept it 
in place. 
3.  Authority: The options examined here are those that remain 
when the legal system produces an unjust outcome. One 
means of retaining legitimacy while taking these actions 
would be to attempt to change these laws. While this may 
be wise in the long-run, it is not a reliable strategy because 
governments using domestic laws as a shield against inter-
ventions do not want to change, and because changing laws 
can take too long. The Rwandan genocide lasted only 100 
days. It is unlikely that a group of private citizens could have 
changed international communications law in time to jam 
RTLM transmissions and have a meaningful impact.
  Legitimacy in taking these actions rests then on the integrity 
with which the above principles (or other principles for this 
purpose) are employed, and the consensus of voices standing 
behind them. When possible, illegal protective activities and 
the determination of how and why they are justified should 
be conducted in a fully transparent manner. Most impor-
tantly, the mandate to take on these activities should come 
from the populations in harm’s way, through focus groups, 
surveys, conferences with civil society, public statements by 
civilians in harm’s way, or other means of obtaining a fair 
assessment of their wishes and protection needs. We must, 
however, acknowledge that obtaining such a mandate in a 
meaningful way is difficult both due to the challenges of get-
ting quality information in conflict areas and the possibility 
of being misled by vocal minorities, including those with 
their own agendas (such as resistance movements). 
ConClusion
JuStifying Or advOcating actions that break some laws is dif-
ficult, and should remain difficult. But the importance of pro-
tecting civilians from mass atrocities requires exploring every 
option. So long as private citizens have resources to offer for 
protection of civilians when states fail to protect them, we 
should consider how such citizens can act in a manner consistent 
with the supreme importance of the right to life and the prohibi-
tion of genocide, even when doing so requires breaking laws that 
otherwise ought to be respected.  HRB
